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1. Introduction 
During the period 1927-2011 incumbent members of Ireland’s Lower House (Dáil Éireann) 
were re-elected, on average, 81.7 percent of the time. This rate of incumbent re-election is 
amongst the highest in the world. Matland and Studlar (2004) compare re-election rates 
across twenty five countries and find that Ireland has the fourth highest rate of incumbent re-
election
1
. Inordinately high re-election rates may give rise to concerns that incumbency 
conveys an unfair advantage on incumbents versus challengers (Lee, 2008). This may enable 
low quality incumbents to retain their seats by defeating challengers of higher quality or 
deterring challengers from running in the first place. Using election data from 1937-2011, 
this paper estimates the incumbency advantage in Ireland’s proportional electoral system 
using a regression discontinuity design (RDD). This is the first paper to apply RDD to the 
system of proportional representation with a single transferable vote (PR-STV).  
Incumbency advantage can be thought of as having a direct and an indirect effect (Cox 
and Katz, 1996; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997). The direct effect comes from the extra resources 
and perquisites of office which an incumbent has at her disposal. These resources can be used 
by an incumbent to improve her future electoral prospects. Such resources can include access 
to a staffed office, telephones and photocopying, but can also include local decision making 
powers granted to incumbents by government decentralisation (de Janvry et al., 2012). The 
indirect effect refers to the ability of an incumbent to deter or “scare off” high quality 
challengers. If a potential challenger knows the incumbent can take advantage of direct 
officeholder benefits she may decide not to contest the election. This is of particular 
relevance for high quality challengers with a high opportunity cost of their time.  
The PR-STV electoral system provides an interesting setting for the study of 
incumbency advantage as it creates an incentive for incumbents to cultivate a personal 
                                                             
1 The three countries which ranked higher than Ireland in terms of incumbent re-election rates were the United 
States (1
st
), Australia (2
nd
) and West Germany (3
rd 
). 
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following in their local constituency (Marsh et al, 2008). This is due to the fact that multiple 
candidates from the same party are often in open competition with one another and as such 
need to identify themselves as separate from their parties. The preoccupation with cultivating 
a loyal following among the local electorate is illustrated by Wood and Young (1997) who 
find that Irish incumbents spend sixty percent of their time on local constituency matters. One 
way in which an incumbent may boost her personal profile among local constituents is 
through pork barrel spending and the utilization of office perks such as free postage, 
telephone and printing.
2
  
The main difficulty in empirically estimating incumbency advantage is omitted variable 
bias. The multidimensional aspects of a candidate’s quality such as charisma, charm and 
intelligence are typically unobservable and unquantifiable (Levitt, 1994).  If higher quality 
candidates attract more votes, electoral selection will lead to incumbents and challengers 
possessing different characteristics. Failure to control for these differences may lead to biased 
estimates of incumbency advantage (Gelman and King, 1990).   
In order to overcome the problem of selection bias and omitted variable bias, this paper 
adopts a regression discontinuity design (RDD). We focus on very close elections which are 
decided by a narrow margin of victory. The bare winners and bare losers of these elections 
are assumed to be comparable in their unobservable characteristics. This implies that bare 
losers provide a valid counterfactual for bare winners with regard to subsequent electoral 
outcomes. By comparing these outcomes we identify the causal effect of incumbency 
The empirical literature on incumbency advantage has traditionally relied on two 
strategies; the sophomore surge and retirement slump (Erikson, 1971; Alford and Brady, 
1988; Gelman and King, 1990; Cox and Katz, 1996; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997; Jacobson, 
                                                             
2
 In recent years there have been several high profile scandals involving the excessive use of office perks 
by Irish TD’s. One such case involved an incumbent who used 488 print cartridges worth over €50,000 
between 2007 and 2008. This led to restrictions being imposed on the use of cartridges the following 
year. 
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1997, Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002). The sophomore surge method looks at the difference 
in vote shares between the first and second terms for winning challengers and the retirement 
slump uses the difference between vote shares of retiring incumbents and their freshmen 
successors. However the popularity of these techniques has declined in light of work by 
Gelman and King (1990) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) which show that both 
methodologies are prone to sample selection bias.  
Lee (2008) addresses the problem of bias by using a regression discontinuity design 
(RDD) to estimate the causal effect of incumbency in U.S. House elections. The results 
suggest that incumbency causes a 45 percentage point increase in the probability that a 
candidate contests and wins the subsequent election. Lee’s pioneering work in applying RDD 
to estimate incumbency advantage has since been emulated by Hainmueller and Kern (2008), 
Eggers and Hainmueller (2009), Uppal (2009 & 2010), Trounstine (2011) and Liang (2013). 
Caughey and Sekhon (2011) express concerns regarding the application of RDD to US 
House elections. We address the methodological concerns expressed by the authors and show 
that Ireland’s PR-STV system provides a suitable setting for the application of RDD. 
Caughey and Sekhon (2011) caution against over-reliance on parametric techniques. The 
causal effect of incumbency is identified using outcomes of bare winners and bare losers 
whose vote share falls within a small bin width on either side of the fifty percent vote 
threshold. As such, extrapolation using data far from the threshold may not be sufficient in 
itself. In this paper we use both parametric and non-parametric methods. The parametric 
estimation procedure is based on polynomials of various orders, while the non-parametric 
method uses local linear regressions with various bandwidths and kernels.  
Caughey and Sekhon (2011) also suggest that applying RDD to the plurality system of 
the US House of Representatives may not be ideal as the bare winners and bare losers from 
close elections may not be comparable. House elections which are decided by the slimmest of 
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margins tend to be won by the existing incumbent and these outcomes are typically predicted 
correctly by Congressional Quarterly’s pre-election ratings. A House incumbent may have 
very precise information about the number of votes needed to secure victory in a close 
election and can make maximal use of her resources to capture these votes.  In light of this 
Caughey and Sekhon (2011) question the assumption of quasi-random assignment of 
incumbency status among bare winners and bare losers. They acknowledge that RDD may 
perform better in a multi-party electoral system where the threshold for victory is more 
difficult to predict. The PR-STV system in Ireland provides such a setting. We verify the 
suitability of RDD to Ireland’s multi-party, multi-candidate system by applying extensive 
testing to show that bare winners and bare losers are comparable in pre-treatment 
characteristics.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Irish electoral setting and the data. 
The RDD methodology is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results and validity 
tests and Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Irish Electoral Setting and Data 
Ireland is a representative, parliamentary democracy with two Houses of Parliament. The 
Upper House is known as Seanad Éireann and the Lower House as Dáil Éireann. Members of 
Dáil Éireann (referred to as Teachta Dála or TDs) are directly elected by the people at least 
once every five years. Between 1937 and 2011 the average length of time between general 
elections was 3.3 years. Dáil elections are carried out in multi-seat districts which are 
comprised of between 3 to 5 TDs. There are currently 43 districts which elect 165 TDs at 
each general election.  
Elections are conducted using the system of proportional representation with a single 
transferable vote (PR-STV). This system allows voters to rank candidates in order of 
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preferences on a ballot paper. For example the voter places a 1 beside his highest preference, 
a 2 beside his second highest preference and so on. A candidate is elected once she gets 
enough votes to meet a predetermined quota.
3
 Only one of the voter’s preferences is active at 
any one time (i.e. for any one vote count). For example a vote stays with the highest 
preference candidate until that candidate gets elected or eliminated, at which point it transfers 
to the next highest preference candidate that is still in the running. Following a count, if no 
candidate has enough votes to secure election, the least voted candidate is eliminated and his 
votes are transferred. A subsequent count then takes place. The process continues until all 
seats have been filled. It is extremely rare for all seats to be filled based on first preference 
votes meaning that virtually all elections involve multiple counts. 
The two dominant political parties in Irish politics are Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. Each 
of the ruling governments from 1937-2011 consists of one of these two parties. The Labour 
party and the Progressive Democrats party have also enjoyed electoral success, albeit to a 
lesser extent. Table 1 summarizes every election from 1937-2011. A notable feature of Irish 
politics is the consistently high re-election rates with only seven of the twenty-three elections 
dipping below eighty percent. The election of 2011 is notable in that its re-election rate of 64 
percent is the lowest in the sample. This was largely attributable to a collapse in the 
governing Fianna Fáil coalition government in the wake of the November 2010 bailout by the 
EU and IMF. 
The dataset consists of bare winners and bare losers from 882 constituency elections 
over the period 1937-2011. There are 1,764 observations; a bare winner and loser from each 
election. The two main parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, account for 42 percent (n=743) 
and 27 percent (n=485) of the sample respectively. In the PR-STV system, the bare winner is 
the winner of the last available seat and the bare loser is the candidate that receives the 
                                                             
3
 The quota is calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of available seats. One 
is then added to this number. So if there are 10,000 votes and 5 seats to be filled, the quota equals 2,001. 
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highest number of votes among all defeated candidates. The RDD analysis compares bare 
winners and bare losers from election t on their subsequent electoral performance at time t+1. 
As such we use pairs of consecutive elections. The dependent variable uses data from 1938-
2011 and the independent (forcing) variable uses data from 1937-2007.    
 
Table 1: Summary of Irish Elections and Ruling Governments (1937-2011) 
Date of Election Successful 
Party/Coalition 
Number of 
Constituencies 
Duration of 
Government 
in Days 
Re-election 
Rate (%) 
July 1937 FF 34 351 75.4 
June 1938 FF 34 1,832 85.3 
June 1943 FF 34 342 79.2 
May 1944 FF 34 1,345 86.6 
February 1948 FG / L / CP / CT 40 1,211 84.1 
May 1951 FF 40 1,084 82.3 
May 1954 FG / L / CT 40 1,022 84.9 
March 1957 FF 40 1,674 82.0 
October 1961 FF 38 1,281 82.3 
April 1965 FF 38 1,533 82.8 
June 1969 FF 42 1,351 87.8 
February 1973 FG / L 42 1,569 86.6 
June 1977 FF 42 1,456 75.9 
June 1981 FG / L 41 252 85.8 
February 1982 FF 41 279 86.6 
November 1982 FG / L 41 1,546 86.8 
February 1987 FF 41 849 86.4 
June 1989 FF / PD 41 1,259 82.7 
November 1992 FF / L 41 1,654 81.3 
June 1997 FF / PD 41 1,806 72.9 
May 2002 FF / PD 41 1,788 77.3 
May 2007 FF / G / PD 43 1,373 79.5 
February 2011 FG / L  43 n/a 64.0 
Abbreviations: Fianna Fáil (FF), Fine Gael (FG), Labour (L), Progressive Democrat (PD) 
Green Party (G), Clann na Poblachta (CP), Clann na Talmhan (CT) 
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3. Methodology  
Regression discontinuity design (RDD) is a quasi-experimental design that allows for 
identification of treatment effects when assignment to the treatment changes discontinuously. 
This occurs when an underlying (forcing) variable passes a defined threshold. In the case of 
elections, treatment is the assignment of incumbency status and the threshold at which this 
occurs is a specified vote share. For example if two candidates compete for one seat, the 
candidate who exceeds the fifty percent vote threshold becomes the incumbent (i.e. receives 
the treatment). RDD is based on the idea that individuals just below the threshold (bare 
losers) possess comparable traits and characteristics as those just above the threshold (bare 
winners). By comparing the subsequent electoral outcomes of bare winners and bare losers, 
we identify the causal effect of incumbency. 
The fifty percent vote threshold is directly applicable to plurality systems such as the 
United States as in Lee (2008) and Uppal (2010). In the case of Ireland’s PR-STV system we 
generate a threshold which is analogous to the plurality fifty percent vote share. As we are 
interested in examining closely fought contests, we look at candidates who contest the last 
available seat in a constituency (after all vote transfers have been made). One candidate will 
be successful and there will be one runner-up candidate who came closest to winning without 
actually doing so. The winner of the last seat is the “least voted winner” among the newly 
elected incumbents and the runner-up is the “most voted loser” among all losing candidates. 
If candidate j and k contest the final seat, incumbency status is assigned to the candidate who 
achieves a greater than fifty percent share of the two candidate vote. The vote share for 
candidate j is calculated as follows,  
jFinalCount
k
FinalCount
j
FinalCount
j
Share
VotesVotes
Votes


 
We define Ii,t+1 as an indicator of incumbency status at the next election such that, 
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We now turn to a formal motivation for using the RD methodology to estimate incumbency 
advantage. Consider the following regression, 
1,1,1,
.

 tititi IVictory   
Where Victoryi,t+1 equals one if candidate i is elected at time t+1 and zero otherwise. Ii,t+1 is a 
dummy variable for incumbency which is defined above. Unobservable quality is likely to be 
correlated with incumbency status which means that E[εi,t+1 | Ii,t+1] ≠ 0. This leads to a biased 
estimate of the incumbency effect in which, 
E[Victoryi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 1] - E[Victoryi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 0] = β + BIASi,t+1 
Where BIASi,t+1=E[εi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 1]–E[εi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 0]. By examining very close elections, RD 
can virtually eliminate the bias. Close elections are ones in which the Sharei,t’s achieved by 
competing candidates occur in a very close neighbourhood around the incumbency threshold 
(of Sharei,t=0.5). By looking at data in an interval which is close to the threshold we get, 
E[Victoryi,t+1 | 0.5<Sharei,t≤ η] - E[Victoryi,t+1 | η <Sharei,t<0.5] = β + BIAS*i,t+1 
where η is some arbitrarily small number, and BIAS*i,t+1=E[εi,t+1 |0.5<Sharei,t≤ η]–E[εi,t+1 | η 
<Sharei,t<0.5]. In the limit as η→0, the margin of votes separating the bare winner and bare 
loser becomes negligible. The assumption underpinning the RD methodology is that in these 
very close elections, the predetermined characteristics of the bare winners and bare losers are 
comparable. Therefore as η→0 the bias disappears and we are left with the true estimate of 
the incumbency effect, 
0
lim

E[Victoryi,t+1 | 0.5<Sharei,t≤ η] - 
0
lim

E[Victoryi,t+1 | η <Sharei,t<0.5] = β 
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The electoral outcomes at time t+1 are estimated separately for those to the right of the 
threshold (bare winners) and those to the left of the threshold (bare losers),  
(1)                                       )5.0(. 1,,1,   titiLLti SharefVictoryL   
(2)                                       )5.0(. 1,,1,   titiRRti SharefVictoryR   
Where fR(·) and fL(·) are polynomials in the forcing variable. It is necessary to model the 
forcing variable in this way as the conditional expectation function E[Victoryi,t+1 | Sharei,t] 
may be non-linear. Failure to do so could result in a non-linearity in the CEF being 
mistakenly identified as a discontinuity. For convenience, we subtract the threshold value (of 
0.5) from the forcing variable in equations (1) and (2). This ensures that the incumbency 
effect at the threshold is equal to the intercept terms yielding an estimate of incumbency 
advantage equal to  .ˆˆ LR    
An alternative to estimating two separate regressions for the winners and losers is to 
estimate one single “pooled” regression (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The advantage of this is 
that it yields direct estimates and standard errors. The pooled regression is the following,  
This specification includes interactions between the polynomial terms and the incumbency 
dummies. This is to capture any non-linearity which may arise from the interaction of the 
incumbency dummy with Sharei,t.  
We verify the robustness of the parametric estimates using a non-parametric technique 
which does not impose a functional form on the CEF. We employ the method of local linear 
regression. For each data point we run a linear regression of the dependent variable on the 
forcing variable using data within an optimal bandwidth h. In general, for a data point 
Sharei,t=x0, we estimate the following linear regression, 
 (4)              
2
   ,
2
for      )5.0.( 001,,1, 





 
h
x
h
xShareShareVictory i,ttititi     
(3)         )5.0(..)5.0(.. 1,,1,,1,1,   titititititi SharefISharefIVictory 
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The predicted value of equation (4) evaluated at x0 yields the non-parametric estimate. To 
estimate the causal effect of incumbency, we compare the outcomes of bare winners and bare 
losers by estimating linear regressions within an optimal bandwidth h to the left and right of 
the threshold. When estimating boundary points we cannot mix treated and untreated data as 
this would invalidate the RD methodology. To the left of the threshold we run the following 
regression,
 
  (5)               5.0),5.0(Sharefor           )5.0.( 1,,1, hShareVictory i,ttitiLtiL     
and to the right, 
  (6)               )5.0(,5.0Sharefor           )5.0.( 1,,1, hShareVictory i,ttitiRtiR     
The intercepts give the predicted values at the threshold so that the causal effect of 
incumbency is given by .ˆˆ LR    For convenience we combine equations (5) and (6) and 
estimate one single pooled equation. Using the bandwidth  )5.0(),5.0(Share hhi,t   we 
estimate the following regression, 
(7)    )5.0.(.)5.0.(. ,,1,,1,1, titititititi ShareIShareIVictory     
In this regression, β is the estimate of incumbency advantage. Both approaches yield the 
same estimate such that .ˆˆ LR     
4. Results 
Candidates with a positive (negative) margin of victory in election t may become the 
incumbent (challenger) candidate in election t+1. However not all candidates from election t 
decide to contest election t+1. It may be the case that some candidates choose not to run in 
election t+1 if they believe their probability of winning is small, e.g. incumbents who believe 
they are likely to lose their seats may strategically retire before election the election. 
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Therefore, estimating the effect of incumbency on the probability of winning election t+1, 
conditional on running in t+1 may produce estimates which are biased upwards.
4
 Instead of 
using the probability of winning conditional on running, we use the probability of running 
and winning in election t+1 as the outcome variable. In addition, we use three other outcome 
variables in this paper, all of which are unconditional with regard to the decision to rerun in 
the next election; the number of votes received, the percentage of the quota received and the 
probability of running in t+1. The number of votes and percentage of the quota received 
provide an extra layer of information on top of the probability of running and winning which 
is a binary variable. The probability of running in t+1 allows us to gauge the size of the 
indirect (deterrence) effect of incumbency. 
Figure 1 plots the outcome variables at time t+1 against the forcing variable at time t 
(Sharei,t). Equation (3) is estimated using a fourth order polynomial in Sharei,t and the 
predicted probabilities are shown by the dashed line. We also plot local averages of the 
outcome variable taken at 0.01 intervals of Sharei,t. The vertical line at the fifty percent vote 
share shows the threshold at which incumbency status is assigned. 
In each of the four outcome variables we observe a sharp discontinuity at the threshold. 
Incumbency causes an eighteen percentage point increase in a candidate’s probability of 
running and winning in election t+1. Incumbents also receive approximately 1,200 more first 
preference votes and an extra sixteen percentage point share of the quota compared to non-
incumbent counterparts with comparable characteristics. The results also point to a 
substantial deterrence effect of incumbency. The difference in the probability of rerunning at 
time t+1 between bare winners and bare losers is about twenty percentage points. This 
suggests that incumbency acts as a barrier against re-entry of high quality challengers.  
                                                             
4
 For example, consider an incumbent who wins by a razor thin margin at t but does not feel confident of 
victory at t+1. He may decide to strategically retire before the election. If we only consider the probability 
of winning conditional on running at t+1, we are ignoring the fact that this bare winner at t would likely 
have lost at t+1 had he decided to run. This would bias the estimate of incumbency advantage upwards 
and this is why we use the probability of running and winning as the outcome variable. 
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FIGURE 1: The outcome variable at time t+1 is regressed on an incumbency indicator, a fourth order polynomial in Sharei,t and interactions between the 
incumbency indicator and polynomial terms. The dashed line plots the predicted values of the outcome variable at t+1. The dots are local averages of the 
outcome variable taken over 0.01 intervals of Sharei,t.   
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Table 2 shows estimates of the incumbency effects from the parametric and non-
parametric estimation procedures. The optimal bandwidth used in the non-parametric 
specification minimises the mean squared error in the regression discontinuity design as in 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Both methods yield comparable estimates of the 
incumbency advantage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The parametric specification estimates equation (3) using a fourth order 
polynomial in the forcing variable (Sharei,t). The non-parametric specification 
estimates equation (7) using optimal bandwidths which minimise the mean 
squared error in the RD design (as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012). Non-
parametric estimate use a rectangular kernel. *** significant at 1%. ** significant 
at 5%. * significant at 10% 
 
 
The estimates are also robust to numerous specifications. Table A1 of the appendix presents 
parametric estimates using third, fourth and fifth order polynomials as well as non-parametric 
estimates which vary the size and shape of the kernel. In all specifications the incumbency 
effects are significant and of a similar order of magnitude. 
Our estimates of incumbency advantage are of a smaller magnitude than those reported 
in RDD studies of the United States Congress. Uppal (2010) and Lee (2008) find that 
 
Table 2: Estimates of Incumbency Effects 
Difference in Outcome Between Bare Winners and Bare Losers 
  
Parametric 
Specification 
Non-Parametric 
Specification 
Pr(Running & Winning at t+1) 
 
0.172** 0.178*** 
  
(0.071) (0.037) 
    
Quota Share at t+1 
 
0.154*** 0.171*** 
  
(0.051) (0.035) 
 
   
First Preference Votes at t+1 
 
1,230***
 
1,244***
 
 
 
(429) (280) 
 
   
Pr(Rerunning at t+1) 
 
0.212*** 0.171*** 
  
(0.065) (0.039) 
  
  
Observations   1,678 1,678 
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incumbency increases the probability of electoral success in the U.S. by approximately thirty 
and forty percentage points respectively. Our results are more in line with German and UK 
elections where Hainmueller and Kern (2008) estimate the effect at twenty percentage points. 
 
Political Party Variation 
Each of the 23 elected governments from 1937-2011 involved either Fianna Fáil or Fine Gael 
as the main party. Fianna Fáil has the most electoral success forming 17 of the 23 Irish 
governments and electing the largest number of deputies. We examine whether the 
incumbency advantage differs across parties by estimating its effect separately for Fianna Fáil 
and Fine Gael as well as “other” candidates (non FF and FG). The estimates are shown in 
Table 3. 
The results indicate that Fine Gael candidates enjoy the largest incumbency advantage 
of the three groups. The probability that a bare winner from Fine Gael reruns and wins at time 
t+1 is 24 percentage points higher than that of a bare loser from the same party. Fine Gael 
incumbents also enjoy a larger incumbency advantage over their non-incumbent party 
counterparts when measured by the vote share at t+1, first preference votes at t+1 and 
probability of rerunning at t+1. The effect for Fianna Fáil and others is not statistically 
significant. 
 
Government and Opposition Variation 
We categorise candidates into two groups; those who are part of the ruling government and 
those in opposition. The estimates of incumbency advantage for both groups of candidates 
(government and opposition) are shown in Table 4 for each of the four outcome variables
5
.  
                                                             
5
 The coefficients for government incumbents and opposition incumbents are in relation to their respective non-
incumbent challengers. 
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Table 3: Political Party Incumbency Effects 
Difference in Outcome Between Bare Winners and Bare Losers 
Pr(Running & Winning at t+1) 
Fianna Fáil 0.0690 
 (0.0976) 
Fine Gael 0.235** 
 (0.118) 
Others 0.150 
 (0.128) 
   
Quota Share at t+1 
Fianna Fáil 0.161** 
 (0.0658) 
Fine Gael 0.145* 
 (0.0816) 
Others 0.113 
 (0.0876) 
   
First Preference Votes at t+1 
Fianna Fáil 1,250** 
 (541.8) 
Fine Gael 1,323* 
 (694.1) 
Others 1,019 
 (718.0) 
   
Pr(Rerunning at t+1) 
Fianna Fáil 0.140** 
 (0.0715) 
Fine Gael 0.180** 
 (0.0704) 
Others 0.0976 
 (0.0966) 
   
Observations  1,678 
Equation (3) is estimated for each party using a third order polynomial in 
the forcing variable (Sharei,t). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10% 
 
The results indicate that government incumbents enjoy a larger advantage over government 
challengers compared to opposition incumbents over opposition challengers. This result is 
statistically significant for first preference votes and quota share as indicated by the p-values. 
Figure 2 illustrate the results graphically by plotting the outcome variables at time t+1 
against the forcing variable at time t (Sharei,t) for government and opposition candidates. The 
discontinuity is greater for government candidates illustrating the greater magnitude of their 
incumbency advantage. 
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Table 4: Government and Opposition Incumbency Effects 
Difference in Outcome Between Bare Winners and Bare Losers 
   
Pr(Running & Winning at t+1) Government 0.264** 
  (0.105) 
p=0.344 Opposition 0.130 
  (0.079) 
   
Quota Share at t+1 Government 0.274*** 
  (0.068) 
p=0.068* Opposition 0.116** 
  (0.055) 
   
First Preference Votes at t+1 Government 2,290*** 
  (543) 
p=0.064* Opposition 973** 
  (462) 
   
Pr(Rerunning at t+1) Government 0.232*** 
  (0.064) 
p=0.258 Opposition 0.131** 
  (0.064) 
   
Observations  1,678 
Equation (3) is estimated for government and opposition candidates using a third order 
polynomial in the forcing variable (Sharei,t). The p-values indicate whether the 
difference between the estimates for government and opposition is statistically 
significant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at 1%. ** 
significant at 5%. * significant at 10% 
 
One potential explanation for this result may be that government incumbents are protected 
against government challengers in election t+1. To illustrate this consider the case where the 
Fianna Fáil party form the ruling government. At time t two Fianna Fáil candidates are 
involved in a fiercely competitive battle resulting in one of the candidates being barely 
elected and the other barely losing out. At time t+1 the Fianna Fáil party may not want to see 
a repeat of this bare winner scenario; they would rather see their existing incumbent securing 
comfortable re-election as opposed to fighting another fiercely competitive battle with a 
challenger from the same party, thereby running the risk that both candidates split the votes 
and neither gets elected. As such the party may act strategically to prevent this situation  
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FIGURE 2: This figure plots the outcome from election t+1 against the vote share obtained in election t (the forcing variable). Solid lines are fitted values from 
third order polynomial regressions on either side of the discontinuity.
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from occurring by campaigning in a way that ensures the existing incumbent is safe. This 
strategic behaviour is not possible for opposition candidates. Unlike the government 
candidates who are all part of the same unified party or coalition, the opposition candidates 
are drawn from several different parties. For example, the opposition candidates may be 
drawn from Fine Gael, Labour and the Progressive Democrats. Therefore Fine Gael cannot 
ask the Labour party to protect its incumbent from an overly competitive challenger.  
This explanation appears to be supported by the data. In Figure 2, if we focus on 
incumbents (those to the right of the threshold) we see that government and opposition 
incumbents appear to be comparable at the discontinuity indicating a similar level of electoral 
success in all four outcome variables. However, with regard to challengers (to the left of the 
threshold) we see that challengers from opposition parties have a higher probability of 
winning and receive more votes than government party challengers. 
 
Validity, Balance and Robustness 
The RD design is based on the assumption that bare losers provide a valid counterfactual for 
bare winners. We can test the validity of this assumption by examining whether pre-treatment 
characteristics are the same for these two groups
6
. Any significant differences in these 
characteristics may invalidate the causal inference relating to the incumbency effect. 
Following Caughey and Sekhon (2011), we carry out a rigorous examination of 
covariate balance by examining a number of pre-treatment covariates in a two percentage 
point window on either side of the threshold. The results are shown in Table 5. Using P 
values from Fisher’s exact test and Wilcoxon rank sum tests, we find no statistically 
                                                             
6
 Pre-treatment characteristics that are the same for bare winners and bare losers are described as being balanced 
around the threshold. 
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significant differences between the treated (bare winners) and control (bare losers) groups for 
each of the covariates. This provides strong evidence of balance around the discontinuity
7
.  
In Table 6 we include the pre-treatment covariates in our baseline regression to test 
for incumbency advantage and find that their inclusion does not significantly alter the 
estimates. This provides further evidence that bare winners and bare losers are comparable 
and that regression discontinuity design is a valid methodology in evaluating the causal effect 
of incumbency advantage in Irish elections. 
Table 5: Tests for Covariate Balance 
Variable Name 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
p value 
from  
Tests 
p value 
from 
RDD 
1st Preference Votes, t-1 5853.29 5882.38 0.834 0.528 
Share of a Quota, t-1 0.60 0.48 0.151 0.543 
Running & Winning, t-1 0.61 0.51 0.359 0.675 
Running, t-1 0.77 0.80 0.825 0.626 
1st Preference Votes, t 5164.60 5038.48 0.465 0.806 
Being a Fianna Fáil Candidate, t 0.47 0.41 0.372 0.809 
Being a Fine Gael Candidate, t 0.25 0.34 0.127 0.905 
Being an Independent Candidate, t 0.06 0.04 0.571 0.316 
Being a Labour Party Candidate, t 0.14 0.12 0.709 0.449 
Government supporter, t 0.38 0.31 0.351 0.386 
Being an Incumbent, t 0.52 0.57 0.526 0.567 
Covariate balance between treated (n=125) and control (n=125) in a 2% window around 
the discontinuity. The p values for dichotomous variables are from Fisher's exact test. 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests are used for continuous variables. Two-sided p values are 
reported. Calculations are based on non-missing values. Fourth order polynomial 
functions are used for the RDD 
 
 
We examine the density of the assignment variable as in Lee and Lemieux (2010). If an 
imbalance is observed in the density on either side of the threshold this may call the 
validity of the design into question. It is clear from the histogram in Figure 3 that the 
density is balanced on either side of the threshold and no discontinuous bin-to-bin 
jumps exist, further supporting the validity of the design.  
 
                                                             
7
 Other covariates, such as campaign spending and political donations, are not available for the vast majority of 
the sample under discussion here. Such information only exists for the elections since 1999. 
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Table 6: Sensitivity of Estimates to Inclusion of Pre-Treatment Covariates 
    
4th Order 
Polynomial  
Share of a 
Quota, t+1 
No Covariates 0.147*** 
  (0.0514) 
Covariates 0.149*** 
  (0.0508) 
1st Preference 
Votes, t+1 
No Covariates 1,230*** 
  (429.0) 
Covariates 1,255*** 
  (409.9) 
Running & 
Winning, t+1 
No Covariates 0.172** 
  (0.0709) 
Covariates 0.176** 
  (0.0710) 
Running, t+1 No Covariates 0.212*** 
  (0.0646) 
Covariates 0.214*** 
  (0.0651) 
The following covariates were added: 1st preference votes at 
time t, political party affiliation, member of the governing 
party at time t and incumbency status at time t. 
 
Figure 3: Histogram showing density of assignment variable at time t 
 
Note: Bin Width set at 1% 
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5. Conclusion 
Incumbent politicians may enjoy an incumbency advantage due to direct and indirect 
officeholder benefits. Direct benefits include free postage, free telephone, free printing and 
greater media exposure. Indirect benefits involve the incumbent’s ability to deter high quality 
challengers. The study of incumbency advantage in the Irish political system is of particular 
interest given the incentives facing incumbent politicians in the PR-STV electoral setting. 
Candidates from the same party must compete against one another and as such need to 
identify themselves as separate from their parties. An incumbent may achieve this by taking 
full advantage of perks of office such as free postage and printing in order to boost her 
personal profile among constituents.  
It is true that incumbent politicians in Ireland enjoy one of the highest rates of re-
election in the world. However this on its own does not provide evidence of an incumbency 
advantage. High re-election rates may be driven in part by a selection effect; incumbents 
must be of high enough quality to win an election in the first place in order to become an 
incumbent. Separating officeholder benefits from selection effects poses a challenge due to 
unobservable candidate quality which may lead to omitted variable bias.  
This paper overcomes this bias by using regression discontinuity design to exploit the 
near-random assignment of incumbency generated by close elections in Ireland’s lower house 
of parliament. In doing so, we find officeholder benefits have a significant causal effect on an 
incumbent’s chances of re-election. Bare winners of an election at time t are 18 percentage 
points more likely to enjoy electoral success at time t+1 compared to bare losers. There is 
also a strong deterrence effect of incumbency as it poses a barrier to the re-entry of 
challengers. Bare winners of an election at time t are twenty percentage points more likely to 
rerun at time t+1. We also find heterogeneity in the incumbency advantage at the party level 
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with the magnitude of the effect being largest for the Fine Gael party. The estimates reported 
are robust to various parametric and non-parametric specifications. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Estimates of Incumbency Advantage for Various Parametric and Non-Parametric Specifications 
N=1678 Non-Parametric  Parametric (Polynomials) 
Bandwidth ½ x Optimal 2 x  ½ x Optimal 2 x  3rd 
Order 
4th 
Order 
5th 
Order Kernel Rectangle Rectangle Rectangle  Triangle Triangle Triangle  
Share of Quota, t+1 0.137** 0.171*** 0.171***  0.134** 0.158*** 0.164***  0.173*** 0.154*** 0.141** 
 (0.0647) (0.0350) (0.0350)  (0.0632) (0.0466) (0.0351)  (0.0418) (0.0513) (0.0591) 
                     
1st Preference Votes, t+1 1,104** 1,244*** 1,244***  1,106** 1,265*** 1,312***  1,386*** 1,230*** 1,138** 
 (520.4) (280.2) (280.2)  (513.4) (379.1) (285.3)  (349.6) (429.0) (494.5) 
                     
Running & Winning, t+1 0.169*** 0.178*** 0.178***  0.163*** 0.181*** 0.176***  0.180*** 0.172** 0.145* 
 (0.0605) (0.0371) (0.0371)  (0.0600) (0.0459) (0.0381)  (0.0615) (0.0709) (0.0855) 
                     
Running, t+1 0.199*** 0.171*** 0.171***  0.193*** 0.188*** 0.184***  0.211*** 0.212*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0677) (0.0385) (0.0385)  (0.0662) (0.0501) (0.0384)  0.173*** 0.154*** 0.141** 
Note: Non-parametric RDD uses local linear regressions to estimate the discontinuity. Parametric RDD uses polynomials fitted to either side of the 
discontinuity (Lee, 2008). For non-parametric estimates, the optimal bandwidth is found using the method outlined by Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012). For robustness, we include bandwidths of half the optimal and twice the optimal. We also show results for bandwidths of different shapes; 
rectangular and triangular. For the parametric estimates we present results for third, fourth and fifth order polynomials. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. 
  
 
